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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of foreign versus domestic ownership in improving 
the financial health of acquired firms. In particular, it explores the impact of foreign 
and domestic acquisitions on financial risk reduction of acquired firms in Italy and 
Spain over the period 2002-2010. To estimate causal relationships, we control for 
selection bias by applying propensity score matching techniques. Our results 
indicate that foreign acquisition leads to a significant and steady reduction in 
financial risk. In contrast, the relationship between domestic acquisition and 
financial risk appears to be smaller and statistically less robust. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In the current paper, we examine the influence of foreign ownership on the financial risk of 
acquisition targets. We revert to different strands in international business and finance 
literature to decipher the impact of cross border acquisitions on financial risk reduction, an 
element that is underexplored.  
 
The impact of foreign ownership on performance has been in the forefront of international 
business and finance literature for several decades. Yet, findings remain inconclusive. There 
is an abundance of evidence supporting the superiority of foreign owned firms over their 
domestic counterparts (Boardman et al., 1997, Douma et al., 2006, Gedajlovic, 1993). From a 
resource based view, firms owned by foreign firms, typically large ones, can benefit from 
firm-specific advantages of the parent company, -- i.e. technological expertise, networking, 
access to capital etc. -- which can positively influence firm performance (Aybar and Ficici, 
2009, Douma et al., 2006, Dunning, 1998). From an agency point of view, foreign firms are 
assumed to be better monitored and controlled, presenting an overall more robust financial 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), particularly in 
institutional settings with weaker governance (Heugens et al., 2009). Nevertheless, industry 
and country specific factors (Barbosa and Louri, 2005, Globerman et al., 1994), agency costs 
(Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) and/or information asymmetries (Aybar and Ficici, 2009, 
Abdioglu et al., 2015) have been reported to offset the benefits of foreign ownership.  
 
Empirical studies on cross-border acquisitions have also offered insights to the debate, with 
several studies supporting a positive impact on performance (Li et al., 2015, Markides and 
Ittner, 1994, Ning et al., 2014). Yet, this strand has mainly focused on standard performance 
variables, and specifically profitability, sales growth, or market power (Aybar and Ficici, 
2009, Doukas and Travlos, 1988, Markides and Ittner, 1994, von Eije and Wiegerinck, 2010). 
The few studies that have explored the impact of cross border acquisitions on wider 
performance measures, such as productivity, operational profitability or market value 
(Boardman et al., 1997, Ning et al., 2014), have presented, in most cases, contrasting results. 
Additionally, very few have explicitly compared foreign versus domestic acquisitions to help 
establish the dominance of either group (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009), and even fewer have 
looked at the impact on the target rather than the acquirer (Haleblian et al., 2009).  
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With the 7
th
 global Merger Wave
5
 well under way, and acknowledging the importance of 
cross border acquisition as an internationalization strategy (Dunning, 1998, Li et al., 2015), 
we believe that it is imperative to better understand the impact of foreign acquisitions on the 
performance of both acquirer and target firms. Additionally, and while most major economies 
seem to be recovering from another global economic crisis, it is clear that financial risk 
management is key to sustainable firm performance. So far foreign ownership has been 
associated with lower financial risk
6
 and thus better performance (Fatemi, 1984, Michel and 
Shaked, 1986). Meanwhile, foreign owned entities can overcome financial restrictions in their 
environments more easily than their domestic counterparts (Alfaro and Chen, 2012, Desai et 
al., 2008, Harrison and McMillan, 2003, Varum et al., 2014). Yet, what we do not know is 
whether foreign ownership can in fact reduce leverage and financial risk. To our knowledge, 
none of the former studies have explicitly factored in the impact of cross-border acquisitions 
on financial risk reduction.    
 
Our study contributes to the international business literature in three distinct ways. First, we 
explore the relationship between changes associated with foreign ownership and the financial 
health of the target firms. We particularly examine the causal effect of acquisitions on two 
measures of firm-level financial risk: ‘Gearing’ (short and long term debt to shareholders 
funds ratio) and ‘Leverage’ (short term debt to total assets ratio). Second, we particularly 
compare matching samples of both domestic and foreign acquired firms. This research design 
allows us to isolate and measure the effect of foreign ownership with a high degree of 
confidence. Third, we focus on two economies, namely Italy and Spain, which have received 
limited attention in the relevant literature. Extant research has placed a particular emphasis on 
large market-based economies, such as the USA and the UK. Nevertheless, Italy and Spain, 
are two of the largest bank-based economies in the world. As such, they are less efficient at 
allocating capital, managing risks and encouraging governance compared to market-based 
financial systems (see Levin, 2002; Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993; Hillier et al., 2011). The 
absence of more developed stock and private equity markets, introduce additional difficulties 
for domestic firms in raising new capital. Hence, in economies like Italy and Spain, the 
presence of foreign investors -- acting as market substitutes -- may be central to the overall 
market growth. Consequently, a better understanding of the effects of foreign investment, 
                                                        
5
 …starting in 2011, as a consequence of the rise of the big emerging countries (BRICs). 
6 Michel & Shaked (1986) have reported that domestic corporations are significantly less capitalized, have 
higher systematic and total risk relative to multinationals. Fatemi (1984) claimed that foreign owners would 
provide shareholders with risk-return opportunities, superior to those provided by domestic firms. 
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especially in less market-oriented economies, is of crucial importance with managerial and 
policy implications.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses in more detail how our contribution is 
related to previous studies; Section 3 outlines the empirical model specification and describes 
the data; Section 4 reports the empirical results and investigates their robustness; Sections 5 
and 6 provide discussion, conclusions and further implications.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
An extensive number of scholars from different strands of the literature have been involved in 
deciphering the impact of foreign vs domestic ownership and performance. Despite the 
voluminous studies, findings remain still inconclusive, with empirical studies depicting both 
positive and negative relationships.  
 
2.1. Foreign vs Domestic Ownership and Performance 
 
Three main theories have been put forward in deciphering the ownership – performance 
relationship: the resource based view, the agency and the institutional theory.  
 
From a resource based view, firm heterogeneity is attributed to firm-specific resources and 
capabilities which are both valuable and difficult to imitate within a certain domain. The 
international business literature has advocated that one of the drivers for internationalization 
is the possession of ownership-specific advantages, not available to domestic firms in the host 
countries (Aybar and Ficici, 2009, Barbosa and Louri, 2005). Technological expertise and 
specialized production processes, superior management and marketing capabilities, trusting 
relationships with distributors and customers, as well as access to financial and human capital 
are only some of the key advantages identified (Caves, 1996, Douma et al., 2006, Dunning, 
1998, Heugens et al., 2009). When effectively deployed in a foreign market, these advantages 
help their proprietors exploit host market imperfections, can offer them efficiency and market 
power advantages, while help them overcome transaction costs, the liability of foreignness 
and other barriers of internationalization (Barbosa and Louri, 2005, Buckley, 1988, Dunning, 
1998, Harris and Robinson, 2003, Markides and Ittner, 1994).  
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On these grounds, foreign ownership has been associated with positive performance and 
several scholars have provided evidence for the superiority of foreign firms over their 
domestic counterparts (Boardman et al., 1997, Caves, 1996, Douma et al., 2006, Gedajlovic, 
1993, Heugens et al., 2009). For example, Boardman et al. (1997) argued that foreign 
subsidiaries display superior performance than their domestic counterparts, mainly due to the 
formers’ possession of unique tangible and intangible assets. Studying the 500 largest non-
financial Canadian businesses, they indeed revealed a clear performance dominance of 
multinational firms over the domestic ones, corroborating earlier Canadian studies by Shapiro 
(1980) and Gedajlovic (1993). Moreover, foreign ownership has been associated with higher 
overall productivity (Harris and Robinson, 2003), and greater firm resistance to domestic 
demand contractions (Varum et al., 2014). 
 
From an agency point of view, agency problems within a corporation have been attributed to 
conflicting desires between the principals (shareholders) and the agents (managers), 
particularly when the former are too disperse (Douma et al., 2006, Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Foreign corporate ownership has been associated with both positive and negative 
effects on performance: the costs and benefits associated with higher control (monitoring). 
On one hand, foreign ownership has been known to enhance managerial control and hence 
shareholder protection, especially in the presence of institutional voids (Heugens et al., 2009). 
By exhibiting higher concentration of share ownership, corporate foreign owners, such as 
large multinationals, can “set and effectively impose control mechanisms that maximize 
performance and minimize managerial opportunism” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 17), 
leading to the dominance of foreign over domestically owned companies (Boardman et al., 
1997, Boardman and Vining, 1989, Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). On the other hand, agency 
costs associated with the imposition of control mechanisms, along with tunneling effects and 
minority shareholder expropriation, are negative influences of foreign ownership, which 
could cancel out the positive effects on performance (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, 
Heugens et al., 2009).  
 
From an institutional perspective, it has also been firmly suggested that firm, industry and 
country factors affect significantly the ownership-performance relationship. In fact, industry 
characteristics such as industry concentration, size, growth, intensity and dynamism, the 
country level of development, as well as firm size and age, have been ascribed to 
significantly influence multinational spillover effects, performance and efficiency levels. In 
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some cases, these factors have even been reported to offset any positive effects of foreign 
ownership. Indeed, Globerman et al. (1994), in contrast to Shapiro (1980) and Gedajlovic 
(1993), reported no significant differences between Canadian domestic and foreign firms, 
once controlling for the effects of capital intensity and size. Similarly, Barbosa and Louri 
(2005) revealed that foreign firms in Greece and Portugal are not exhibiting higher 
performance evidence when controlling for size and industry dominance. Meanwhile, 
Heugens et al. (2009) showed that although ownership concentrated is generally positively 
related to performance in Asia, it varies across different contexts and level of concentration.
7
  
 
2.2. Cross-Border Acquisition and Performance 
 
Acknowledging that cross-border acquisition is an important entry strategy for 
internationalization (Dunning, 1998, Li et al., 2015), this body of literature has contributed 
significantly to the foreign ownership – performance relationship debate.  
 
Cross-border deals are accredited a higher impact on performance than domestic ones due to 
expectations of synergistic gains associated with the firm-specific advantages brought in the 
host-market by the foreign acquirers (Aybar and Ficici, 2009, Doukas and Travlos, 1988, 
Douma et al., 2006, Li et al., 2015, Markides and Ittner, 1994). Therefore, it has been long 
argued that a firm’s foreign-acquisition announcement should be viewed positively by the 
market, as a signal “to transfer or expand a firm's resources internationally that will enable 
the firm to exploit uniquely international distortions in capital markets or production” 
(Doukas & Travlos, 1988: 1162); this should be manifested in the acquirer’s increased market 
value after the announcement of the deal.  
 
Indeed, Markides and Ittner (1994) revealed that acquirers with higher intangible firm-
specific advantages typically enjoy higher returns and higher market acceptance (positive 
reactions to C-B announcement) than their domestic counterparts. These findings are 
corroborated by Chari et al. (2009) and Kohli and Mann (2012), who showed that firms with 
intangible firm-specific assets enjoy heightened post-merger performance, and higher post-
market reaction to the announcement of the deal. Similar evidence can also be found in 
emerging market studies. For example, Ning et al. (2014) and Li et al. (2015) explored 335 
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 Concentrated ownership exhibit a strong and positive influence to firm performance in Japan, S. Korea, India 
and Taiwan, but insignificant in China, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
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and 367 cross-border acquisitions from Chinese MNEs respectively. Both studies showed a 
strong positive market reaction to the announcement deals, despite the cultural barriers 
associated with these deals.  
 
Nevertheless, a consensus is yet to be reached regarding the overall cross border acquisition - 
performance relationship (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Not only some empirical 
studies have provided evidence suggesting a negative relationship between cross border 
activities and performance (Aybar and Ficici, 2009), but the existence of factors moderating 
the above relationship has raised further concerns. For example, Bertrand and Betschinger 
(2012), after examining 120 cross-border deals among Russian medium and large firms, 
discovered a consistent negative impact on the acquirer’s profitability, which was neutralized 
only for the industry related (horizontal) deals. Li et al. (2015) also reported that although 
industry similarity doesn't guarantee a positive outcome, it can significantly mitigate the post-
merger acquisition performance relationship. Finally, several studies have emphasized the 
time horizon of the performance effects, denoting that a positive effect of a cross-border deal 
might be present only during the first couple of days of the announcement, but not in the 
longer run (Barbopoulos et al., 2014, Ning et al., 2014). 
 
The negative-diversification discount hypothesis,
8
 agency costs, liability of foreignness, lack 
of experience in acquisitions, and information asymmetries are some of the key explanations 
provided to justify the negative performance effects (Aybar and Ficici, 2009, Doukas and 
Travlos, 1988). Differences among measures of performance have also been highlighted as an 
explanation for the lack of convergence among the empirical findings. Whereas most of the 
relevant studies have used profitability measures to examine performance effects, like the 
return on assets (ROA), other performance measures, such as sales, market value, operational 
profitability and productivity, have offered different insights (Boardman et al., 1997, Ning et 
al., 2014, Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). For example, both studies by Boardman, et al. 
(1997) and Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) showed that while ownership concentration was 
positively related to ROA, it was insignificant for sales growth or other productivity 
measures, and negative for market-to-book value. More recently, Ning, et al. (2014) found 
that although short term (2 and 3-day event windows) outcomes were generally positive for 
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  In efficient market conditions, the announcement of a foreign acquisition should have a negative signal, 
denoting the inability of the firm to further utilize its resources internally. This coupled with the high agency 
costs of monitoring cross border activities, should have an overall negative effect on performance.  
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the acquirer, in the longer term they remained positive only for operational profit margins but 
turned negative for both ROA and Tobin’s q measures.     
 
It is noteworthy that although in all relevant studies the superiority of foreign acquisitions 
have been implied, most of the existing studies do not make a distinction between foreign and 
domestic acquisitions. Few notable exceptions provide however indication for distinct 
differences among the groups. For example, Arnold and Javorcik (2009), distinguished 
between foreign and domestic privatization cases in Indonesia, and revealed positive effects 
for foreign ownership alone. Hijzen et al. (2013) considered changes of ownership from 
foreign to domestic and from domestic to foreign in five countries; they showed that only the 
latter is associated with a large positive wage premium, driven by the creation of high-skilled 
jobs. Furthermore, the majority of the empirical studies have concentrated on acquirer’s 
performance rather than the performance of target firms (Haleblian et al., 2009). Yet, the few 
that have focused on the latter have showed target returns to be higher than those achieved by 
the bidders (acquirers), particularly for the longer term.  
 
The above discussion suggests that it is rather precarious to make assumptions for the foreign 
ownership – target performance relationship based on past findings, since they majorly 
ignored the distinct differences between acquirer vs target firms, and any discrete superior 
effects of foreign over domestic deals (if any).  
 
2.3. The Role of Leverage on Risk and Performance 
 
As noted above, performance measures might have been a reason for the inconsistencies in 
the foreign ownership - performance relationship. While the majority of relevant studies have 
focused mainly on a few profitability, market or sales measures,
9
 the link between foreign 
ownership and risk has never been properly explored.  
 
A substantial literature within international business and finance has long explored the 
relationship between capital structure -- and leverage in particular -- and firm performance. 
                                                        
9
  A notable exception is the study by Arnold and Javorcik (2009), which considered a wide range of outcomes 
that can potentially be influenced by foreign owners. Using data from Indonesia, they found that foreign 
acquisition contributed to significant improvement of a firm’s productivity, leading to an expansion of the firm 
in terms of output, scale, average wage, investment and participation in foreign markets. 
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The complexity of the linkages between the levels of debt and performance has been 
highlighted, whereas arguments suggesting a bi-directional causality relationship have been 
put forward (Berger and Di Patti, 2006).  
 
It is well acknowledged that optimal capital structure is the result of a trade-off between 
benefits and costs associated with debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Debt financing may 
lead to tax savings and a reduction of agency costs. However, debt also increases the risk of 
financial distress and raises the direct and indirect costs associated with bankruptcy. 
According to agency theory (Harris and Raviv, 1991, Jensen and Meckling, 1976), higher 
levels of leverage have a positive impact on performance. Higher levels of debt, compared to 
equity, are expected to reduce agency costs by aligning the interests of managers with those 
of shareholders. Greater leverage increases the threat of liquidation which causes personal 
losses to managers in terms of salaries and reputation (Grossman and Hart, 1982), whilst 
increases pressure on managers to generate the cash flow required to pay interest expenses 
(Jensen, 1986). Nevertheless, at higher levels of leverage, additional debt can result into 
precarious increases in agency costs. In such cases, overall interest expenses may further 
escalate, in an attempt to compensate debt holders for facing a higher risk of financial distress 
and bankruptcy (Berger and Di Patti, 2006). Moreover, high level of leverage may further 
limit the capacity of a firm to engage with valuable investment opportunities that could have 
a potential positive effect on its value, specifically for firm facing higher growth 
opportunities (Myers, 1977).  
 
The stakeholder theory developed by Titman (1984) provides additional insight on the 
implications of bankruptcy risks, associated with high levels of leverage, and their impact on 
firm performance. This theory highlights that financial distress and bankruptcy risk affect not 
only a firm’s financial stakeholders, but a wide range of stakeholders like suppliers, 
customers, and employees. This is particularly relevant for firms that have unique products 
(Kale and Shahrur, 2007, Titman and Wessels, 1988) and engage in relation specific 
investments with their customers, suppliers, and employees. A firm’s bankruptcy risks 
impose costs (e.g. switching costs) on its stakeholders in case of liquidation. Customers and 
suppliers will be unwilling to engage in relation specific investments with a firm facing 
significant bankruptcy risks, whereas reduction in human capital investment (Jaggia and 
Thakor, 1994) could lead to negative impact on total firm value given the importance of 
human capital for competitiveness (Pfeffer, 1994).  
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All the above suggests a non-monotonic relationship between leverage and performance, and 
highlights that in situations where financial risk is exasperated, higher levels of leverage may 
reduce the value of the firm and negatively impact its performance. In addition, many 
exogenous factors might be impacting on the relationship. For example, environmental 
factors and macroeconomic shocks play an important role in determining the optimal capital 
structure of a firm. The presence of asymmetric information reduces the capacity of lenders 
to accurately assess the credit worthiness of firms. When macroeconomic risks increase, 
lenders will require higher premium risks which is expected to reduce the capacity of firms to 
raise external funds (Caglayan and Rashid, 2014). Increased risk reduces cash flow and 
imposes higher costs on the firms, including input costs, production costs, management costs 
and sales costs (Amit and Wernerfelt, 1990).  
 
2.4. Foreign vs Domestic Ownership and Financial Risk 
 
The extant literature of foreign ownership on firm behavior and performance is rather 
restricted to the implications on profitability. There has been limited attempt to explicitly link 
the role of foreign ownership with financial risk implications of the target (domestic) firms.  
 
Early studies in finance have already suggested that foreign ownership can lead to lower 
financial risk and as such offer higher performance (Fatemi, 1984, Michel and Shaked, 1986). 
In addition, studies that have concentrated on firm behavior during financial crises are in 
support of a positive contribution of foreign ownership. For example, Harrison and McMillan 
(2003) investigated the impact of foreign direct investment on domestic firms’ credit 
constraints in the Ivory Coast. Their results showed that domestic firms experienced credit 
constraints while foreign-owned firms did not. Blalock et al. (2008), examined firm 
performance in Indonesia in the aftermath of the 1997 East-Asian financial crisis, and 
revealed that foreign ownership limited the extent of credit constraints through easier access 
to capital from the international market or from the parent firm. Similarly, Desai et al. (2008) 
found the affiliates of US multinationals in emerging markets to exhibit superior performance 
than local firms by relying on internal capital flows within the multinational firm. Finally, 
Alfaro and Chen (2012) provided evidence that affiliates of multinationals were more 
resilient to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, particularly those with strong production and 
financial linkages with the parent company.  
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In the aftermath of the global economic crisis, it is clear that financial risk management is key 
to sustainable firm performance. Especially in bank-based economies like Spain and Italy, 
which are less efficient at managing risks and encouraging governance (Levin, 2002; 
Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993; Hillier et al., 2011), improving financial risk management could 
be detrimental for the economy. From the above discussion, it can be inferred that foreign 
ownership may, among others, act as a buffer against challenging economic contexts. But 
how will this manifest in the case of changing ownership from domestic to international? In 
other words, will the acquisition of a firm’s control by a foreign entity be beneficial 
particularly in contexts, where liquidity and capital constraints are present?  
 
To our knowledge, no study has explicitly tested this empirical question. We expect that 
firms acquired by foreign investors, by enjoying greater availability and stability of internal 
funds, lower dependence on short-term borrowing and long-term debt, will result in lower 
levels of leverage, as also showcased by Greenaway et al. (2014). We test our hypothesis by 
particularly comparing matching samples of both domestic and foreign acquired firms for 
Italy and Spain, two southern European economies that were severely affected by the 2007-
2008 global financial crisis.  
 
3. Research Design 
 
In this section we present the empirical methodology, data sources, and preliminary 
descriptive statistics relating to acquisitions in Italy and Spain and to the main variables that 
we use.  
 
3.1. Data Sources 
 
We base our analysis on financial account data (unconsolidated) extracted from the Amadeus 
data set for firms in Italy and Spain for the period between 2002 and 2010. We limit our 
sample to firms that are classified as public or private limited firms and that operate in 
manufacturing and services industries. To be included in our sample, firms must also have 
employment data for at least one year. Financial institutions and insurance companies are 
excluded from the analysis due to compatibility issues with the format of financial accounts.  
Information on acquisitions is retrieved from the Zephyr database and matched to Amadeus 
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data using firm identifiers of acquired firms.
10
 This matching process allows us to identify 
Italian and Spanish firms that were acquired during the period of study, as well as the 
nationality of the acquiring firm.  
 
The extracted (monetary) variables for manufacturing firms are deflated using industry 
producer price indices at the 2-digit NACE code level, whereas those for services firms are 
deflated using the GDP deflator with base year 2005. Data on price indices and employment 
size classes at the country-industry level are collected from Eurostat. The final sample is an 
unbalanced panel with more than 500,000 firm-year observations for each country. 
 
3.2. Empirical Methodology 
 
The key objective of our empirical analysis is to evaluate the causal effect of both foreign and 
domestic acquisition on firm’s leverage and gearing. To do that, we compare leverage and 
gearing measures for foreign and domestically acquired firms with the performance of non-
acquired firms.  
 
To control for endogenous factors affecting the acquisition decision process,
11
 we follow 
recent empirical work on international investment and foreign ownership (Arnold and 
Javorcik, 2009; Alfaro and Chen, 2012) and compute the acquisition effect using propensity 
score matching, as suggested by Heckman et al. (1997). Formally, the effect of acquisition in 
a given time period can be expressed as:  
 
𝐸((𝑌1 − 𝑌0)|𝐴𝑐𝑞 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝐴𝑐𝑞 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0|𝐴𝑐𝑞 = 1)                   (1) 
 
where 𝑌 denotes the outcome of interest and the subscript of 𝑌 represents the hypothetical 
circumstances under which the outcome is evaluated, taking the value one for foreign 
(domestic) acquisition and zero for non-acquisition. In particular, we focus on two outcome 
variables measuring the firm’s capital structure; namely ‘Leverage’ (ratio of short term debt 
to total assets) and ‘Gearing’ (short and long term debt to shareholders funds ratio). In other 
words, Eq. (1) represents the difference between the outcome measure for an acquired firm 
and the analogous measure for the same firm had it not been acquired. The latter, however, is 
                                                        
10
  The availability of acquisition deals in Zephyr at the time of extraction was relatively lower in 2010 (see 
Table 1). However, excluding the year 2010 does not change our results. 
11
  Such as self-selection of large and more productive firms (Helpman et al., 2004) and/or “cherry-picking" of 
the best performing ones (Harris & Robinson, 2003). 
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an unobserved counterfactual, and hence we need to construct it using the matching 
procedure; that is, by identifying a non-acquired match with similar observable characteristics 
for each acquired firm. The underlying assumption for the validity of this approach is that, 
conditional on observable characteristics, the treated (acquired firms) and the matched non-
treated (non-acquired domestically owned forms) would perform similarly under the same 
circumstances. To this end, we can re-write Eq. (1) as:  
 
[𝐸(𝑌1|𝐴𝑐𝑞 = 1, 𝑋) − 𝐸(𝑌10|𝐴𝑐𝑞 = 0, 𝑋)] −  [𝐸(𝑌01|𝐴𝑐𝑞 = 1, 𝑋) − 𝐸(𝑌10|𝐴𝑐𝑞 = 0, 𝑋)]    (2)  
 
where the first term captures the causal effect of acquisition (the difference between the 
outcome of acquired firms and a group of non-acquired domestically owned firms with 
similar observable characteristics) and the second term captures the selection bias (the 
difference between the outcome of acquired firms, under the hypothetical circumstances that 
they had not been acquired, and the outcome of non-acquired domestically owned firms). 𝑋 is 
a vector of observable characteristics. Our aim is to minimize the selection bias by applying 
propensity score matching techniques and thus estimate the causal effect of acquisition as the 
difference in the sample average of the outcome for treated and non-treated firms.  
 
As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), conditioning on all variables in the treatment 
model is equivalent to conditioning on the propensity score (the predicted probability of 
treatment), which in our case is the conditional probability of acquisition given firm 
characteristics and past firm performance. We thus proceed in two stages. In the first stage, 
we estimate the propensity score, separately for each country, using the following probit 
model: 
′𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛′𝑖𝑛𝑟𝑦 = Φ{𝛽𝒁𝑖𝑛𝑟𝑦−1 + 𝜆𝑛 + 𝜂𝑟 + 𝜓𝑦 + 𝜖}                     (3) 
where ‘Acquisition’ is a dummy variable that equals one in the year of a foreign (domestic) 
acquisition, and zero if the firm is not foreign-owned or a multinational and has not been 
acquired during the sampled period. Ownership is captured by any ownership stake over a 
threshold of 50% of total shareholding. Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of a 
standard normally distributed random variable, Z is a vector of control variables, expressed in 
natural logarithms and lagged by one year to account for pre-acquisition characteristics; 𝑖, 𝑛, 
𝑟, 𝑦 index firm, industry (at 2-digit NACE code level), region (at NUTS 2 code level), and 
time, respectively. We follow the existing literature on acquisitions and include the following 
control variables in vector Z:  
14 
 
Productivity: measured as turnover per employee. Turnover corresponds to total 
operating revenues measured as net sales plus stock variations and other operating 
revenues.  
Scale: measured by the number of employees. 
Age: measured by the number of years since establishment. 
Capital to labour ratio (‘K/L’): measured as tangible assets by employee.  
 
We also include the outcome variable and its squared term: 
Leverage:  measured as the ratio of short term debt to total assets, where total assets is 
the sum of current assets and fixed assets and short term debt corresponds to the sum 
of short term financial debts to credit institutions (loans and credits) and part of long 
term financial debts payable within the year. 
Gearing: measured as the ratio of short and long term debt to shareholders funds. 
 
The addition of the outcome variable and its square term ensure that matches assigned on the 
propensity score will be homogeneous in terms of their previous capital structure. To capture 
unobserved heterogeneity, we also include industry (𝜆𝑛), region (𝜂𝑟) and year (𝜓𝑦) fixed 
effects. Finally, to ensure that the sample is representative of the relevant population of firms 
in each industry, all regressions are weighted by size classes at the industry level. More 
specifically, firms are divided in five size classes based on the median number of employees; 
with categories being: less than 10, between 10 and 19, between 20 and 49, between 50 and 
249 and 250 or more.  
 
In the second stage, we employ five-nearest neighbors matching
12
  and compare the outcome 
variables within observations matched by the propensity score. More precisely, each treated 
firm 𝑡 is matched with 𝑁𝑡
𝑐 = 5 controls that are closest in terms of the propensity score. The 
outcome variable of each of the controls 𝑐 matched to treated firm 𝑡 is weighted by 𝑊𝑡𝑐 =
1/𝑁𝑡
𝑐. We also impose the restriction that the matched control observations must come from 
                                                        
12
 In the five-nearest neighbors matching, the counterfactual outcome is made up of the average of the five 
control group observations closest in their propensity score to the treated observation. To reduce the likelihood 
of poor matches, the matching is carried out with replacement (each control can serve as the counterfactual for 
more than one treated observation) using a 0.005 caliper (the difference in the propensity score between 
treated and control observations). In addition, we exclude observations outside the common support, bound by 
the lowest propensity score of a treated observation and the highest propensity score of a matched control 
observation. 
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the same industry, size class, and productivity group
13
 as the acquired firm. This eliminates 
the probability that different levels of capital structure across industry, size, and productivity 
combinations exert influence on our estimated results. To examine whether the model for the 
propensity score is misspecified, we perform tests of the balancing property; that is, we test 
the significance of differences between acquired and matched firms for each variable entering 
the propensity score estimation. Formally, the average treatment effect (‘ATT’) of acquisition 
in the year of acquisition (when  𝑗 = 0) and the subsequent three years (when  𝑗 = 1,2,3) is 
calculated as: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑗 =
1
𝑁
∑(𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟+𝑗
𝑡
𝑁
1
) −  
1
𝑁
∑(𝑊𝑐𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟+𝑗
𝑐
𝑁
1
)  𝑗 =  0,1,2,3     (4) 
where 𝑊𝑐 = ∑ 𝑊𝑡𝑐𝑡 . 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 1 summarizes the number of foreign and domestic acquisitions and the number of pre-
matched control observations by country and year. It shows a steady increase of domestic and 
foreign acquisitions in both countries up to 2008, followed by a drop of acquisitions in 2009. 
Table 1 also shows a larger number of domestic acquisitions compared to foreign 
acquisitions, in both countries and all years. 
 
---- Insert Table 1 here ---- 
 
Table 2 lists the top ten home countries of foreign acquirers, separately for Italy and Spain. 
These top 10 countries account for almost 80% of all acquisition deals. As we can see from 
this table, most acquirers originate from other European countries. More precisely, 70% of 
foreign acquisitions of Spanish firms and 60% of foreign acquisitions of Italian firms are 
made by acquirers originating from other European economies. Outside Europe, firms from 
the United States hold a significant share of the foreign acquisitions (18.45% in the case of 
Italy, and 12.5% in the case of Spain). Furthermore, most acquirers originate from developed 
economies, and only India appears in the top 10 of home countries for acquisitions made in 
Italy.  
                                                        
13
 We divide firms into five productivity groups based on the median value of the turnover per employee. 
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---- Insert Table 2 here ---- 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables, while distinguishing between 
three categories of firms; firms acquired by foreign companies, firms acquired by domestic 
companies, and domestic non-acquired firms. We can observe here that, on average,
14
 target 
firms are more productive, larger and older than non-acquired domestic firms; they are also 
less capital intensive, have a lower gearing ratio but a higher leverage ratio in comparison to 
domestic non-acquired firms. When comparing between foreign and domestic acquisitions, 
we can see that firms acquired by foreign companies are larger, more productive, less capital 
intensive and have a lower gearing ratio than firms acquired by domestic investors. 
 
---- Insert Table 3 here ---- 
 
4. Findings   
 
4.1. Determinants of Foreign and Domestic Acquisition 
 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of Eq. (3) for each country, exploring some of 
the most prevalent factors influencing the decision of a foreign or domestic investor to 
acquire a firm in Italy or Spain. 
 
---- Insert Table 4 here ---- 
 
As a first point, we can notice that, as expected, highly productive firms are more attractive to 
foreign acquirers than to domestic acquirers: the estimated coefficient on ‘Productivity’ 
appears to be positive and statistically significant only in the equations estimating the 
probability of foreign acquisition. Past studies have already suggested that foreign investors 
tend to prefer well-performing firms to invest in (Harris & Robinson, 2003; Helpman et al., 
2004). On the contrary, domestic investors who have better knowledge of the local market, 
customers, and business networks, rely less heavily on observable information (i.e. 
productivity) to select their potential targets.  
 
                                                        
14 ... and before controlling for industry, time and region specific effects. 
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Furthermore, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between acquisition 
and size (measured in terms of the number of employees) for both countries, and a negative 
relationship between acquisition and age for Italy. On one hand, large, established firms, 
having considerable market experience and assets to offer, can be seen as more reliable 
investment options, particularly in less efficient markets, like Italy and Spain (Healy, et al. 
1992; Barbosa and Louri, 2005). On the other hand, younger firms can potentially offer 
higher growth opportunities for their acquirers, able to offset the liabilities of experience and 
size. 
 
Capital intensity is also found to significantly affect acquisitiveness, as also shown in the 
studies of Shapiro (1980) and Gedajlovic (1993). Yet, the impact of capital intensity is 
different across the two countries: foreign acquirers of Italian firms tend to favor higher 
capital-labour ratios, whereas those of Spanish firms tend to favor lower capital-labour ratios. 
Finally, acquisitiveness is significantly influenced by industry, year and region specific 
effects (coefficients not reported). 
 
It is noteworthy to add, that in the case of Italy prior capital structure does not seem to be a 
determinant factor of acquisitions, foreign or domestic. Nevertheless, Spain seems to be a 
different case altogether; we do find that in Spain higher levels of leverage do increase the 
probability of foreign acquisitions, while reducing the probability of domestic acquisitions.  
 
4.2. The Impact of Acquisitions on the Capital Structure of Acquired firms 
 
The predicted probabilities (or propensity scores) of acquisition, calculated using the 
estimates presented in Table 4, form the basis of the matching procedure. We thus proceed by 
considering the results from the five-nearest neighbors matching.  
 
Panel (a) of Table 5 shows the ATT of foreign acquisition on ‘Gearing’. The evidence 
obtained suggests that foreign acquisition leads to a significant and steady reduction in long 
term debt ratio: while the treated and control groups start with very similar levels of 
‘Gearing’ in the pre-acquisition period, the former exhibit lower levels of debt in the 
subsequent years. Specifically, during the year of acquisition, foreign-acquired Italian 
(Spanish) firms have 49% (40%) lower gearing ratio compared to their matched control 
observations. The reduction in the ‘Gearing’ ratio progresses to 62% (54%) in the first year 
18 
 
following the acquisition, reaches its peak at 67% (81%) in the second year, and declines 
moderately to 57% (78%) in the third year.
15
 The relatively small impact of foreign 
acquisition in Year 0 suggests the presence of restructuring costs that increase the gearing 
ratio in the year of completion.  
 
Panel (b) of Table 5 shows the ATT of domestic acquisition on ‘Gearing’. The results 
indicate that, when firms are acquired by domestic investors, changes to the capital structure 
are smaller and statistically less robust. More precisely, for Italian firms, the ATT of 
domestic acquisition is negative and statistically significant in all four years, but appears to 
be substantially lower in absolute value compared to that of foreign acquisition. For instance, 
in the three post-acquisition years, reduction in the gearing ratio of acquired firms amounts to 
24%-32% compared to the control group. However, for Spanish firms, the ATT of domestic 
acquisition is positive (acquired firms have higher gearing ratio than their non-acquired local 
matches) and marginally statistically significant in the year of completion, but fails to reach 
statistical significance in the three years thereafter. Formal paired 𝑡-tests between acquired 
and matched control firms fail to reject the balancing hypothesis for all variables entering the 
propensity score estimation, confirming that our matching procedure has grouped together 
relatively homogeneous firms (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). 
 
The decrease in debt associated with foreign acquisition is verified when we use ‘Leverage’ 
as the outcome variable (see panel (c) of Table 5). The results indicate that foreign-acquired 
firms exhibit on average lower leverage ratios than their matched control observations: the 
reduction in leverage ratio of treated firms is both statistically and economically significant, 
starting from 60% and 24% in the acquisition year (for Italy and Spain respectively) and 
reaching a peak at 89% and 84% in the second year after acquisition. In contrast, the effect of 
domestic acquisition on ‘Leverage’ is either small or statistically insignificant or of the 
opposite sign (see panel (d) of Table 5). For instance, in the case of Spain, we detect a 
positive and statistically significant rise in short term indebtedness during the completion 
year and the two post-acquisition years. 
 
 
 
---- Insert Table 5 here ---- 
                                                        
15
  Since the ATT is calculated for the log of the gearing ratio, the reported percentages are obtained by taking 
the exponential of the ATT and subtracting one.  
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4.3. Robustness Tests 
 
We perform a number of tests to assess the robustness of the above findings (results available 
upon request).  
 
First, we implement changes to the propensity score equation, such as adding profitability 
ratios and square terms of scale and age among the regressors. Second, we consider 
alternative matching methodologies, including the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching and 
Epanechnikov kernel matching. The results obtained from these tests provide evidence that 
supports the findings of the previous section: foreign acquisition leads to a significant and 
steady reduction in ‘Gearing’ and ‘Leverage’, whereas domestic acquisition is associated 
with smaller and statistically less robust (or of the opposite direction) effects. 
 
Third, we check whether the observed differences between foreign acquired, domestically 
acquired and non-acquired firms are uniquely associated with the crisis and post-crisis years. 
To investigate this issue, we restrict the sample to include the pre-2008 period and carry out 
the same analysis as before. Despite the obvious comparability problems with this approach 
(due to the smaller number of matched cases), the matching estimates for the pre-crisis period 
are similar to those for the full sample period and lead to the same inferences. This suggests 
that the capital structure effects of foreign acquisitions in Italy and Spain are not driven by 
the fact that the acquiring firms are originating from countries that were less severely affected 
by the crisis. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we investigate the role of foreign versus domestic ownership in improving the 
financial health of acquired (target) firms. We particularly investigate the impact of foreign 
and domestic acquisitions on financial risk reduction of acquired firms in Italy and Spain.  
 
The empirical literature has been predominately concentrated on the post-acquisition 
performance relationship of acquiring firms, while measuring performance mainly in 
productivity and profitability terms (Li et al., 2015, Markides and Ittner, 1994, Ning et al., 
2014). Our study contributes to this body of literature in two distinct ways. First, we provide 
clear evidence of the impact of foreign and domestic acquisitions on the performance of the 
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target firms and offer an appreciation of how the change in ownership affects the 
counterparty instead. Second, we examine measures of financial risk (namely, gearing and 
leverage), which have never been explicitly examined in the past, to further augment our 
understanding regarding the overall performance impact of a change in ownership.  
 
In order to estimate the causal impact of ownership changes, we control for selection bias by 
applying propensity score matching techniques. Our results confirm our expectations that the 
change from domestic to foreign ownership leads to a significant reduction in the financial 
risk faced by target firms and a lower reliance on short and long term debt. The reduction in 
financial risk is not associated with a change of ownership per se, but only when the 
ownership is transferred to foreign investors. As such, whereas foreign ownership is 
positively related to risk reduction for the target firms, domestic ownership offers no 
significant improvement in the financial risk faced by these firms. In fact, in the case of 
Spain, our findings suggest a contrary effect, with domestic acquisition actually resulting in 
an increase of the leverage ratio of target firms and an overall deterioration of a firm’s 
financial health. 
 
The above findings clearly denote the overall performance prevalence of foreign owned firms 
over their domestic counterparts. We can see that foreign ownership not only yields higher 
profitability and productivity for the target firms (i.e. Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Hijzen et 
al., 2013), but can further act as a deterrent against financial over-exposure and risk, leading 
as such to more financially healthy target firms. The ‘agency theory’ proponents have long 
supported that the presence of foreign investors has the power to enhance managerial control, 
(Heugens, et al. 2009), minimize managerial opportunism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and 
increase overall shareholder protection. We offer strong support to the above.  
 
Furthermore, our findings provide support to the notion that foreign ownership can shield 
firms from financial constraints. Whereas past research has showed that in periods of capital 
illiquidity, foreign owned firms are typically better performing, literature has always 
attributed these achievements to the role of the extra financial help and support received by 
their foreign investors (Alfaro and Chen, 2012; Blalock et al., 2008; Desai et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, our study clearly shows that the changes imposed to the financial structure of 
the target firms via the acquisition process, are equally responsible for any performance 
improvements. This is a very important finding particularly for foreign investors targeting 
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opportunities in countries that have been badly hit by recession, such as the recent examples 
of Italy and Spain.  
 
Finally, the above findings have important policy implications that may contradict the old 
conservative European agendas in encouraging the emergence of “national champions” 
(Monti, 2006; Soares, 2008). It is clearly showcased here that foreign acquisitions can benefit 
significantly acquired (domestic) firms, offering consequently important overall contributions 
to the economy in which they operate. Therefore, foreign investment opportunities should be 
welcomed and supported by national governments, especially in bank-based economies or 
even during times of recession and adversity. Implementing policies aimed at attracting 
foreign investment can also be particularly beneficial for countries like Italy and Spain, which 
have engaged, so far, in low cross-border acquisition activities
16
 and are typically 
characterized by underdeveloped private equity markets and thus restricted financing 
availability for domestic firms. 
 
6. Limitations and Future Research 
 
As outlined in the previous section, our study offers important and novel contributions to the 
foreign acquisition – performance relationship debate. However, it also has some limitations, 
which can be used as the starting point for future research work in this area. First, while we 
can identify the nationality of the acquiring firms, we are not able to collect data on other 
characteristics of these firms, such as size, age and financial performance, in a consistent 
fashion. Our analysis thus cannot explain whether the observed acquisition effects vary 
across targets acquired by different types of acquiring firms (e.g. large business groups vs 
small firms). Second, due to data availability and the complexity of the research design, our 
study focuses only on two economies. Extending the sample to include more countries could 
enable scholars to examine whether the positive relationship between foreign acquisitions and 
financial risk reduction is actually a universal phenomenon, and to explore the conditionality 
of effects upon host country characteristics, such as the level of financial development and 
the type of financial system. Likewise, by constructing a multi-national panel dataset and 
employing a large number of propensity score matched cases, one could investigate which 
                                                        
16
 According to Morresi and Pezzi (2014), Italy and Spain had significantly lower levels of cross-border 
acquisitions as target countries during the period 2002-2010 (in terms of value in dollars and number of deals), 
compared to the United Kingdom, Germany and France. 
22 
 
industries can benefit the most from foreign acquisitions, in terms of changes in their capital 
structure. Finally, a fruitful avenue for future research would be to assess whether the 
enhanced financial health in the first years following a change to foreign ownership (as 
documented in this study) can lead to better survival prospects and increased engagement in 
innovation and exporting activities for target firms.  
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Tables  
 
Table 1: Counts of acquisitions and controls by year 
  Italy   Spain 
Year 
Foreign  
Acquisitions  
Domestic  
Acquisitions   Controls    
Foreign  
Acquisitions  
Domestic  
Acquisitions   Controls  
2002 108 315 118204 
 
117 315 112264 
2003 108 234 123488 
 
117 495 117783 
2004 126 342 129424 
 
198 306 123000 
2005 279 342 135380 
 
297 369 127805 
2006 297 351 141238 
 
234 666 131990 
2007 324 468 146106 
 
423 810 134802 
2008 378 567 149368 
 
567 1260 136249 
2009 180 342 149388 
 
216 837 136551 
2010 54 90 149395 
 
54 198 136553 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Top 10 countries of foreign acquirers 
 
Italy 
  
Spain 
Country 
Number of 
Acquisitions  
% of 
Total 
 
Country 
Number of 
Acquisitions  
% of 
Total 
United 
States 342 18.45 
 
France 351 15.79 
Germany 225 12.14 
 
United 
Kingdom 342 15.38 
France 207 11.17 
 
United 
States 279 12.55 
United 
Kingdom 180 9.71 
 
Germany 180 8.10 
Spain 108 5.83 
 
Italy 171 7.69 
Switzerland 81 4.37 
 
Portugal 135 6.07 
Belgium 72 3.88 
 
Belgium 99 4.45 
Sweden 72 3.88 
 
Sweden 99 4.45 
India 54 2.91 
 
Netherlands 72 3.24 
Netherlands 54 2.91 
 
Switzerland 45 2.02 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
 
Italy 
 
Spain 
 
Foreign  Domestic  Controls 
 
Foreign  Domestic  Controls 
 Acquisitions Acquisitions   Acquisitions Acquisitions  
Productivity 634.82 481.52 481.16 
 
380.08 313.33 289.04 
 
(1352.89) (1405.62) (1092.77) 
 
(888.27) (632.71) (575.42) 
Scale 174.13 148.12 26.40 
 
140.27 99.36 25.76 
 
(385.1) (296.55) (85.78) 
 
(239.2) (227.56) (79.23) 
Age 20.77 19.93 15.87 
 
20.99 18.57 13.82 
 
(15.77) (14.28) (12.97) 
 
(15.7) (14.72) (10.48) 
K/L 103.95 120.78 144.98 
 
117.64 148.41 224.88 
 
(516.92) (590.7) (806.27) 
 
(598.39) (808.51) (878.09) 
Gearing 149.94 169.36 196.91 
 
98.12 126.34 103.38 
 
(196.61) (195.57) (226.09) 
 
(147.28) (179.73) (165.09) 
Leverage 12.24 13.08 11.18 
 
7.44 7.22 3.14 
 
(17.33) (18.05) (16.13) 
 
(11.32) (12.36) (9.02) 
   Note: Columns report mean values. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Table 4: Propensity score estimation 
 
Italy Spain 
 
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic 
 
Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition 
Control for Gearing Ratio 
ln(Productivity) 0.276*** -0.004 0.253** 0.022 
 
(0.045) (0.111) (0.103) (0.052) 
ln(Scale) 0.325*** 0.221*** 0.255*** 0.274*** 
 
(0.025) (0.063) (0.055) (0.03) 
ln(Age) -0.045*** -0.055*** 0.074 -0.012 
 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.090) (0.015) 
ln(K/L) 0.067** 0.028 -0.114* 0.071* 
 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.060) (0.036) 
ln(Gearing) 0.258 0.320* -0.010 -0.005 
 
(0.241) (0.183) (0.015) (0.01) 
ln(Gearing)
2
 -0.032 -0.039* -0.012*** -0.003 
 
(0.028) (0.023) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant -12.412*** -5.861*** -8.591*** -4.458*** 
 
(1.094) (1.452) (1.593) (0.723) 
Industry, time, region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 573171 636119 607160 694528 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.231 0.182 0.306 0.164 
Control for Leverage Ratio 
ln(Productivity) 0.267*** -0.012 0.208** 0.046 
 
(0.044) (0.096) (0.101) (0.046) 
ln(Scale) 0.344*** 0.222*** 0.248*** 0.237*** 
 
(0.02) (0.061) (0.056) (0.039) 
ln(Age) -0.038** -0.046*** 0.112 -0.030 
 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.080) (0.020) 
ln(K/L) 0.064*** 0.026 -0.089* 0.044 
 
(0.024) (0.030) (0.049) (0.034) 
ln(Leverage) -0.019 0.018 0.042*** -0.064* 
 
(0.026) (0.018) (0.016) (0.036) 
ln(Leverage)
2 
-0.003 -0.001 0.005** -0.014** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
Constant -9.230*** -5.194*** -8.417*** -4.462*** 
 
(0.757) (1.32) (1.501) (0.727) 
Industry, time, region dummies yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 640313 697837 715897 791181 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.227 0.179 0.271 0.185 
Note: Foreign (domestic) acquisition is a dummy variable that equals one in the year of a foreign (domestic) 
acquisition. Explanatory variables lagged by one year. Columns report estimated coefficients. Robust p-values 
in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by country-industry sampling weights. ***,**,* Statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 5: The impact of acquisitions on acquired firms’ capital structure 
Panel (a): Foreign acquisition/ Gearing ratio 
 
Italy Spain 
Year ATT 
 
N ATT 
 
N 
0 -0.683*** (0.170) 137 -0.516* (0.270) 155 
1 -0.980*** (0.226) 123 -0.767** (0.308) 135 
2 -1.121*** (0.246) 110 -1.644*** (0.341) 110 
3 -0.855*** (0.240) 84 -1.525*** (0.425) 76 
Panel (b): Domestic acquisition/ Gearing ratio 
 
Italy Spain 
Year ATT 
 
N ATT 
 
N 
0 -0.552*** (0.120) 208 0.284* (0.171) 323 
1 -0.274** (0.113) 183 0.224 (0.190) 281 
2 -0.268** (0.106) 151 -0.142 (0.247) 208 
3 -0.393** (0.198) 112 -0.348 (0.329) 136 
Panel (c): Foreign acquisition/ Leverage ratio 
 
Italy Spain 
Year ATT 
 
N ATT 
 
N 
0 -0.904** (0.398) 147 -0.269 (0.309) 168 
1 -1.743*** (0.485) 123 -0.940*** (0.303) 139 
2 -2.199*** (0.546) 99 -1.857*** (0.430) 97 
3 -1.814** (0.747) 75 -1.720*** (0.574) 62 
Panel (d): Domestic acquisition/ Leverage ratio 
 
Italy Spain 
Year ATT 
 
N ATT 
 
N 
0 -0.467 (0.345) 219 0.939*** (0.199) 391 
1 -0.423 (0.339) 177 1.192*** (0.269) 300 
2 -0.418 (0.442) 134 0.676** (0.335) 197 
3 -0.266 (0.484) 94 -0.611 (0.406) 135 
Note: five-nearest neighbor matching. ATT denotes average treatment effect on the treated. N denotes the 
number of matched targets. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Balancing tests for matched sample 
      Italy  Spain 
   
Mean t-test Mean t-test 
 
Sample 
 
Treated Control |t| p>|t| Treated Control |t| p>|t| 
Foreign acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.775 12.708 0.57 0.567 12.254 12.231 0.19 0.848 
Gearing ratio 
 
ln(Scale) 3.933 3.796 0.93 0.351 4.098 3.997 0.71 0.480 
  
ln(Age) 2.710 2.713 0.03 0.980 2.832 2.759 0.73 0.467 
  
Ln(K/L) 3.050 3.231 0.92 0.360 2.754 2.648 0.51 0.610 
  
Ln (Gearing) 4.352 4.534 1.12 0.266 2.294 2.804 1.21 0.226 
 
  Ln(Gearing)
2
 20.782 22.351 1.14 0.253 21.641 18.654 1.30 0.194 
 
Year 1` ln(Productivity) 12.760 12.685 0.63 0.532 12.282 12.270 0.09 0.926 
  
ln(Scale) 3.929 3.791 0.93 0.355 4.134 4.013 0.80 0.423 
  
ln(Age) 2.686 2.725 0.29 0.771 2.864 2.749 0.99 0.322 
  
Ln(K/L) 2.994 3.195 0.96 0.339 2.798 2.760 0.17 0.866 
  
Ln (Gearing) 4.298 4.504 1.19 0.237 2.282 2.732 0.94 0.346 
    Ln(Gearing)
2
 20.375 22.075 1.17 0.242 23.308 19.832 1.35 0.179 
Domestic 
acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.466 12.390 0.81 0.416 11.984 11.998 0.14 0.888 
Gearing ratio 
 
ln(Scale) 3.913 3.821 0.69 0.491 3.641 3.584 0.57 0.567 
  
ln(Age) 2.663 2.695 0.33 0.745 2.603 2.585 0.18 0.854 
  
Ln(K/L) 2.863 2.938 0.43 0.670 3.110 3.167 0.40 0.690 
  
Ln (Gearing) 4.565 4.600 0.27 0.784 2.933 2.616 1.07 0.285 
 
  Ln(Gearing)
2
 22.548 22.815 0.25 0.805 22.055 21.739 0.19 0.846 
 
Year 1 ln(Productivity) 12.462 12.415 0.48 0.632 11.958 11.980 0.20 0.844 
  
ln(Scale) 3.927 3.816 0.81 0.420 3.655 3.605 0.49 0.621 
  
ln(Age) 2.702 2.754 0.53 0.595 2.599 2.574 0.23 0.815 
  
Ln(K/L) 2.881 2.981 0.54 0.591 3.165 3.165 0.00 0.999 
  
Ln (Gearing) 4.558 4.570 0.09 0.927 2.785 2.629 0.49 0.627 
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    Ln(Gearing)
2
 22.447 22.569 0.11 0.915 22.074 21.473 0.34 0.732 
Foreign acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.809 12.708 0.89 0.376 12.206 12.185 0.18 0.855 
Leverage ratio 
 
ln(Scale) 3.907 3.771 0.95 0.341 4.138 4.012 0.94 0.346 
  
ln(Age) 2.653 2.640 0.10 0.924 2.792 2.715 0.81 0.418 
  
Ln(K/L) 3.070 3.265 1.00 0.316 2.721 2.633 0.41 0.683 
  
Ln (Leverage) -0.488 -0.671 0.31 0.758 -2.368 -2.760 0.63 0.527 
 
  Ln(Leverage)
2
 24.787 27.779 0.79 0.431 37.409 39.933 0.60 0.547 
 
Year 1 ln(Productivity) 12.789 12.665 0.99 0.322 12.245 12.233 0.10 0.918 
  
ln(Scale) 3.987 3.852 0.90 0.371 4.123 4.018 0.74 0.463 
  
ln(Age) 2.640 2.581 0.36 0.720 2.820 2.684 1.31 0.190 
  
Ln(K/L) 3.032 3.272 1.12 0.265 2.790 2.665 0.55 0.585 
  
Ln (Leverage) -0.635 -0.773 0.21 0.836 -2.733 -3.133 0.59 0.559 
    Ln(Leverage)
2
 25.733 28.857 0.74 0.461 38.989 42.629 0.78 0.435 
Domestic 
acquisition/ Year 0 ln(Productivity) 12.453 12.363 0.98 0.327 11.964 11.959 0.05 0.958 
Leverage ratio 
 
ln(Scale) 3.967 3.825 1.11 0.266 3.666 3.609 0.62 0.538 
  
ln(Age) 2.663 2.663 0.00 0.999 2.515 2.482 0.32 0.749 
  
Ln(K/L) 2.804 2.961 -0.96 0.339 3.022 2.993 0.22 0.826 
  
Ln (Leverage) -0.123 -0.629 1.06 0.289 -3.230 -3.578 0.85 0.396 
 
  Ln(Leverage)
2
 22.885 27.128 -1.38 0.170 43.299 45.394 -0.75 0.456 
 
Year 1 ln(Productivity) 12.445 12.387 0.58 0.564 11.956 11.982 -0.24 0.808 
  
ln(Scale) 3.981 3.855 0.91 0.361 3.692 3.604 0.84 0.400 
  
ln(Age) 2.670 2.680 -0.09 0.925 2.442 2.474 -0.27 0.790 
  
Ln(K/L) 2.776 2.992 -1.23 0.219 3.053 3.007 0.31 0.754 
  
Ln (Leverage) -0.291 -0.557 0.50 0.619 -3.859 -4.092 0.50 0.618 
    Ln(Leverage)
2
 24.067 26.666 -0.75 0.454 47.829 49.067 -0.39 0.699 
Note: The test examines the balancing hypothesis for all variables included in the propensity score, based on their pre-acquisition values. Year 0 refers to the 
sample of matched targets included in the calculation of the ATT in the year of acquisition, whereas Year 1 refers to the sample of matched targets included in 
the calculations of the ATT in the first year following the acquisition. 
 
 
